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Malta 
Whistleblowing in Malta: a note on recent 
developments, proposals and missed opportunities 
"Further legislation which, unfortunately, we have never as 
yet considered seriously, is that on the lines of the so-called 
'whistleblowing' procedures. "1 
A famous whistleblowing case of some years ago had a 
distinct Maltese flavour. This was the notorious case con-
cerning a well-known multinational pharmaceutical firm. A 
Maltese citizen, Stanley Adams, a senior executive with this 
multinational company, discovered that his employers were 
engaging in price-fixing and other breaches of the competi-
tion laws. He revealed details of this illegal activity to the E.U. 
competition authorities in Brussels. For his pains, he was 
hounded and investigated, ending up in a Swiss jail for the 
unauthorised disclosure of business secrets. He later won 
some damages. Adams wrote a book about his experiences, 
a clear indictment of a system where business and the State 
apparatus can conspire "to send whistleblowers to jail to 
punish them for whistleblowing".2 
Malta is a small island state, a former British colony 
currently on the road to accession to E.U. membership, 
possibly within a couple of years. Its legal system is one of an 
increasingly hybrid character. Whereas its private law is 
largely consolidated in a civil code on the continental pattern, 
its public law and institutions broadly follow the British 
model. 
This note analyses the current state of play, arguing that 
there have been various missed opportunities where the 
legislator failed to take the bold steps necessary to protect 
whistleblowers. Despite being specific to the Maltese situa-
tion due to reasons of space, the analysis draws out a number 
of issues relevant to other developing countries. 
At the time of writing,3 the laws of Malta are undergoing 
substantial changes in many important areas. Much of the 
new legislation seeks to bring Maltese law into line with the 
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European acquis. There is no E.U. directive on whistleblowing 
as such, although the European Commission has lately started 
taking some steps to introduce internal reporting procedures 
and safeguards. 
The object of this brief note is to show that in Malta there 
have been no matching developments in whistleblowing 
regulation, which remains largely absent from Maltese law 
except in very limited and precise instances. 
One missed opportunity lies in the field of consumer law. 
In late 2000, amendments to the Consumer Affairs Act 1994 
introduced the first ever rules on product liability. A separate 
new law on product safety came into force in March 2001. 
These laws seek to prevent the production and circulation of 
unsafe products which may cause serious harm to persons 
and property. By and large, the new laws have faithfully 
transposed the relevant E.U. directives. While the directives 
on product safety and liability do not raise the whistleblowing 
issue, they do not appear to prohibit Member States from 
adopting provisions should they wish to. 
It would not be entirely appropriate to include 
whistleblowing rules within a product liability law, since this 
largely concerns private law. The opposite, however, seems 
to be true of product safety law, where whistleblowing would 
fit perfectly. Like the directive which inspired it, the Product 
Safety Act is largely of an administrative nature and accord-
ingly constituted the ideal opportunity for introducing a 
proper workable whistleblowing provision. It is a law crying 
out for such a provision in view of the serious consumer 
health concerns it seeks to address. 
It has been unsuccessfully argued that it would have been 
fairly easy for the product safety law to specifically protect 
such disclosures and to designate the Director for Consumer 
Affairs (responsible for administering the product safety law) 
and the Director for Market Surveillance (responsible for · 
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devising strategies for monitoring the market against unsafe 
products) as the authorities which may receive disclosures. 
Whistleblowing is also absent from competition law. Amend-
ments to the Competition Act of 1994 have just been adopted 
by Parliament. Again largely based on European law, this Act 
had prohibited cartels, abuse of dominant positions, price 
fixing and other restrictive agreements and practices, and 
provides harsh penalties. Recent amendments have attempted 
to strengthen the enforcement powers established in the Act, 
but regrettably no attempt was made to incorporate 
whistleblowing safeguards. 
In late 2000, the government published a White Paper 
proposing a number of substantial amendments and reforms 
to the Criminal Code. The White Paper demonstrates a new 
thrust against corruption as well as the introduction of corpo-
rate liability in certain situations. Indeed, the White Paper 
proposes to expand the definition of corruption and to make 
any companies involved more directly liable to criminal 
prosecution. Corporate criminal liability has so far been 
practically unheard of in Maltese legislation, so this could 
have represented a useful novelty. 
Remarkably, the White Paper makes no reference to the 
benefits of whistleblowing procedures. The White Paper 
ignores the reality that a successful fight against serious 
corporate wrongdoing invariably requires access to relevant 
inside information from within the companies or institutions 
suspected of operating outside the law. 
Maltese law does contain some scattered instances of 
what may be termed mandatory whistleblowing, where par-
ticular office holders are effectively required to blow the 
whistle on a client. This peculiar but minor form of 
whistleblowing has now developed, starting with the Co-
operative Societies Act of 1978. The laws regulating investment 
services,4 banks,5 financial institutions6 and insurance busi-
ness7 all now contain provisions requiring the auditors of a 
regulated entity to report any financial irregularity or illegal-
ity they might discover during the course of their audit work. 
The legal duty of professional secrecy would be set aside to 
the extent necessary to make the disclosure, and failure to 
disclose to the regulatory authorities may carry criminal and 
administrative consequences for the auditors. But there is no 
protection for employees. 
A major obstacle to Maltese would-be whistleblowers is 
represented by the Professional Secrecy Act of 1994 and 
section 257 of the Criminal Code. These punish the unauthor-
ised disclosure of professional or business secrets with severe 
criminal sanctions. In 1999, a small amendment was effected 
to section 257 which exempted from liability members of 
designated professions or regulated businesses (including 
accountants , investment services and insurance operators, 
but not legal practitioners or priests) who, on discovering 
that a client has committed a serious drug-related or a money-
Iaundering offence, report the fact to the public authorities. 
It is unclear why this otherwise sensible exemption was 
limited to disclosures relating to drug and money-laundering 
offences, and was not extended to other serious offences 
such as fraud, corruption and injury to the public health. 
Some whistleblowing rules introduced in other jurisdic-
tions are often located within employment legislation. This 
perhaps serves to highlight the often determining role played 
by ordinary employees and their concern with job security in 
this context. The U.K. Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 is 
one case in point. Generally, one major risk to be weighed by 
any employee contemplating blowing the whistle on wrong-
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doing at his workplace is that his action may amount to a 
breach of this contractual duty. Broadly, every employer 
owes a duty of loyalty to his employer. A breach may lead to 
various possible sanctions including dismissal and a suit for 
civil damages. 
In Malta, during the past 10 years or so, successive minis-
ters responsible for labour matters have repeatedly promised 
that the two main employment laws, namely, the Conditions 
of Employment (Regulation) Act of 1952 and the Industrial 
Relations Act of 1972, were to be updated and substantially 
revised. Latest press reports predict a draft Bill will be 
published shortly. Sadly, the proposals being drafted have 
been shrouded in secrecy, but the minister involved has been 
publicly promising new rules on sexual harassment and equal 
pay for women and similar matters. No evidence is available 
that whistleblowing was ever raised for discussion. Are we 
about to witness yet another missed opportunity? 
In this current state of play of Maltese law, a proposal to 
exploit the imminent employment legislation quickly comes 
to mind. This may be summarised in the form of two propo-
sitions: 
(1) the law should require employers generally to treat their 
employees fairly and to ensure that employees are not 
placed in serious moral conflict situations in the 
workplace; 
(2) the new employment laws should protect employees 
who in good faith disclose to a designated public author-
ity serious illegal activity committed by their employers 
or indeed by fellow employees at their workplace. The 
protection could include a prohibition, backed by ad-
equate sanctions, against any form of retaliatory or dis-
criminatory treatment, including dismissal, demotion or 
other direct or indirect punishment. The law would list 
the authorities to whom an employee could safely dis-
close his concerns. It would also lay down an uncompli-
cated grievance reporting procedure. These safeguards 
should apply both to employees in the private sector 
and-perhaps more importantly-to employees in the 
public sector. 
As part of employment law, these rules would be of general 
application, but still insufficient to cover cases where the 
whistleblower is not an employee. Complementary amend-
ments would also have to be made to the Professional Secrecy 
Act of 1994. 
Within a culture where transparency is more an exception 
than a rule, it should perhaps not be surprising that, in the 
Maltese experience, whistleblowers have generally not been 
well treated and have been considered at best a nuisance, at 
worst a threat. This is not a situation unique to this small 
island. But in the highly charged and polarised Maltese 
political situation, where every vote counts at every local 
council and general election, governments tend to avoid 
handing new opportunities to the opposition to embarrass 
them. Recent developments show that there is no evidence of 
any official willingness or policy to introduce new 
whistleblowing provisions, whether in particular areas of the 
law or in legislation of more general application. One may 
therefore safely predict that Maltese law will not in the near 
future be taking the bold steps required for developing a 
comprehensive and coherent regulatory framework for 
whistle blowing. 
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